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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1155 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CALVIN JAMAR HILL-GAMBLE, 
                               Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 1-04-cr-00166-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 8, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: JORDAN, VANASKIE, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: February 14, 2017) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal arises from the revocation of a term of supervised release and the 
imposition of a 30-month term of imprisonment.  After filing this appeal, Calvin Hill-
Gamble’s counsel filed a Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel and submitted an 
Anders Brief in support of the Motion.  Hill-Gamble has failed to submit any document to 
this Court highlighting a potential appealable issue.  Because Hill-Gamble expressly 
waived his right to a revocation hearing, he admitted to Grade A violations of his 
conditions of supervised release, and the District Court’s sentence was substantively and 
procedurally reasonable, we will affirm. 
I.  
 On September 8, 2004, Hill-Gamble pleaded guilty to charges of possessing a 
firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) – a Class A felony – and 
distributing and possessing with the intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine 
base, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) – a Class B felony.1  On January 28, 2005, the District Court 
sentenced Hill-Gamble to a prison term of 108 months, to be followed by a 60-month 
period of supervised release.  Hill-Gamble began his supervision on December 21, 2012.  
                                              
1 The classification of offenses not otherwise specified is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 
3559.  Because Hill-Gamble’s firearms offense carried a maximum prison term of life, it 
is graded as a Class A felony, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1).  His drug offense carried a Class B 
designation because the maximum term of imprisonment for that crime exceeded 25 
years.  18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(2).  As will be made clear later in this opinion, an offense’s 
classification affects the United States Sentencing Guidelines advisory imprisonment 
range upon revocation of supervised release. 
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 On August 22, 2014, a Swatara Township police officer stopped a vehicle in 
which Hill-Gamble was a passenger.  Two other individuals were in the vehicle with 
Hill-Gamble.  As the officer approached the vehicle, Hill-Gamble and the other passenger 
fled on foot.  The officer took the driver into custody.  A search of the vehicle revealed a 
bag of cocaine base and heroin, three handguns, five pairs of gloves, three black masks, 
and a bag of ammunition.  Eight days later, police arrested Hill-Gamble, charging him 
with firearm and drug offenses under state law.  After a trial in state court in October 
2015, a jury found Hill-Gamble guilty of the firearm and drug offenses.  
 Based upon Hill-Gamble’s state court convictions on the firearm and drug 
offenses, the United States Probation Office petitioned for revocation of supervised 
release.  The District Court held a revocation hearing on January 7, 2016.   
 At the revocation proceeding, the District Court conducted a colloquy, assuring 
that Hill-Gamble understood the nature of the proceedings and his rights.  Hill-Gamble 
waived his right to a hearing and admitted to Grade A violations of the terms of his 
supervised release.  Given Hill-Gamble’s criminal history category of III and his 
admission of Grade A violations, the advisory Sentencing Guidelines imprisonment range 
for his underlying Class A felony was 30 to 37 months, and the advisory range for his 
Class B felony was 18 to 24 months.  See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a).  After listening to the 
prosecutor, defense counsel, Hill-Gamble, and Hill-Gamble’s mother, the District Court 
revoked supervised release and imposed a prison term of 30 months on the underlying 
Class A felony, and a prison term of 18 months on the underlying Class B felony, to be 
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served concurrently but consecutive to Gamble-Hill’s state court sentence.  This appeal 
followed.2   
II.  
 Hill-Gamble’s counsel seeks permission to withdraw pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Rule 109.2 of this 
Court’s Local Appellate Rules.  Consistent with the Anders decision, counsel for a 
defendant may seek to withdraw in this Court if, after reviewing the District Court record, 
he or she is “persuaded that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit.”  3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 109.2(a).  To do so, counsel is required “(1) to satisfy the court that counsel has 
thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues, and (2) to explain why the 
issues are frivolous.”  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation 
omitted).  Our responsibility is to determine “(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled 
[Rule 109.2(a)’s] requirements; and (2) whether an independent review of the record 
presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  Id. (citations omitted).  When reviewing the record, 
“we confine our scrutiny to those portions of the record identified by an adequate Anders 
brief” and “those issues raised in Appellant’s pro se brief.”  Id. at 301. 
 Though he was informed of his right to file a pro se brief, Hill-Gamble has failed 
to submit any document to this Court since his notice of appeal.  Hill-Gamble’s counsel, 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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however, has examined the record and identified four potentially appealable issues: (1) 
the jurisdiction of the court, (2) the adequacy of the proof underlying the violation, (3) 
the voluntariness of the admission to the violation, and (4) the reasonableness of the 
sentence.  As discussed below, we find that Hill-Gamble’s counsel has identified all 
appealable issues and that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal.  
A. The District Court’s Jurisdiction  
 Because the conduct underlying Hill-Gamble’s 2004 federal conviction occurred 
within the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the District Court had jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  In connection with Hill-Gamble’s sentence in that matter, the District 
Court had the authority to terminate, extend, revoke, or modify Hill-Gamble’s term of 
supervised relief, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).  Accordingly, we find that there is no 
basis to challenge the District Court’s jurisdiction. 
B. Adequacy of Proof of the Supervised Release Violation 
 Before revoking a term of supervised release, the District Court was required to 
“find[] by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of 
supervised release.”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).  Here, Hill-Gamble admitted to Grade A 
violations of his terms of supervised release.  Moreover, even without the admission, 
Hill-Gamble’s state court conviction for the state firearm and drug offenses would have 
been adequate proof as to the supervised release violations.  See United States v. Lloyd, 
566 F.3d 341, 344 (3d Cir. 2009).  Therefore, we also find that any challenge to the 
adequacy of proof underlying the revocation of supervised release would be meritless. 
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C. Voluntariness of the Admission 
 Because Hill-Gamble admitted to violating the terms of his supervised release, this 
“inquiry is . . . confined to whether the underlying plea was both counseled and 
voluntary.”  United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989).  We assess whether an 
admission to violating supervised release was knowing and voluntary given the totality of 
the circumstances.  See United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 2006).   
  Hill-Gamble was represented by counsel, and the District Court conducted a 
thorough colloquy, assuring that Hill-Gamble understood the nature of the proceedings 
and his rights.  The District Court also confirmed that Hill-Gamble desired to waive his 
right to a revocation hearing and to admit to Grade A violations.  Hill-Gamble explained 
that he was remorseful and disappointed in himself for violating the terms of supervised 
release, and asked for leniency at sentencing.  In light of these facts, we find that any 
claim that Hill-Gamble did not knowingly and voluntarily admit the supervised release 
violation would be frivolous. 
D. Reasonableness of the Sentence 
 Finally, we find that any attack on the reasonableness of the sentence would be 
meritless.  In the context of revocation sentences, we examine the record to determine 
whether the District Court gave meaningful consideration to the factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and § 3583(e).  See United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542-44 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).  We must also be satisfied that the “sentencing court . . . 
reasonably applied those factors to the circumstances of the case.”  Id. at 543.  Our 
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review of the record confirms that the District Court gave adequate consideration to all 
the pertinent factors and articulated a rational explanation for why the sentence it 
imposed in this matter was appropriate.  We also note that the Sentencing Guidelines 
recommend that a revocation term of imprisonment be served consecutively to the 
conviction that has prompted revocation of supervised release.  See U.S.S.G § 7B1.3(f).  
Under these circumstances, we conclude that any challenge to the reasonableness of the 
revocation sentence would be frivolous.  
III.  
 For the reasons set forth herein, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court 
and grant the request to withdraw as counsel. 
